Cities withour Suburbs: Census 2000
Author: David Rusk
Cities without Suburbs, first published in 1993, has become an influential analysis of America's cities among city planners, scholars, and citizens alike. In it, David Rusk, the former mayor of Albuquerque, argues that America must end the isolation of the central city from its suburbs in order to attack its urban problems.
Rusk's analysis, extending back to 1950, covers 522 central cities in 320 metro areas of the United States. He finds that cities trapped within old boundaries have suffered severe racial segregation and the emergence of an urban underclass. But cities with annexation powers -- -- termed "elastic" by Rusk -- -- have shared in area-wide development.
This third edition is among the first books of any kind to employ information from the 2000 U.S. census. While refining his argument with this new data, Rusk assesses the major trends of the 1990s, including the perceived rebound of central cities, the impact of Hispanic and Asian migration, the growing similarities of older "inner-ring" suburbs to central cities, and the emerging influence of faith-based movements. New recommendations take account of growing restrictions on cities' annexation powers, even in the Southwestern United States, and of new opportunities for federal shaping of home mortgage programs and urban planning processes. Rusk's conclusion stresses cities' growing experience with building political coalitions in pursuit of development and growth.
Table of Contents:
|Introduction: Framing the Issue||1|
|I||Lessons from Urban America||5|
|Lesson 1||The real city is the total metropolitan area - city and suburb||5|
|Lesson 2||Most of America's blacks, Hispanics, and Asians live in urban areas||7|
|Lesson 3||Since World War II, urban growth has been low-density, suburban style||7|
|Lesson 4||For a city's population to grow, the city must be elastic||9|
|Lesson 5||Almost all metro areas have grown||14|
|Lesson 6||Low-density cities can grow through in-fill; high-density cities cannot||16|
|Lesson 7||Elastic cities expand their city limits; inelastic cities do not||17|
|Lesson 8||Bad state laws can hobble cities||17|
|Lesson 9||Neighbors can trap cities||19|
|Lesson 10||Old cities are complacent; young cities are ambitious||22|
|Lesson 11||Racial prejudice has shaped growth patterns||23|
|Lesson 12||Elastic cities capture suburban growth; inelastic cities contribute to suburban growth||25|
|Lesson 13||Elastic cities gain population; inelastic cities lose population||28|
|Lesson 14||When a city stops growing, it starts shrinking||30|
|Lesson 15||Inelastic areas are more segregated than elastic areas||30|
|Lesson 16||Major immigration increases Hispanic segregation||33|
|Lesson 17||Highly racially segregated regions are also highly economically segregated regions||33|
|Lesson 18||Inelastic cities have wide income gaps with their suburbs; elastic cities maintain greater city-suburb balance||34|
|Lesson 19||Poverty is more disproportionately concentrated in inelastic cities than in elastic cities||36|
|Lesson 20||Little boxes regions foster segregation; Big Box regions facilitate integration||38|
|Lesson 21||Little boxes school districts foster segregation; Big Box school districts facilitate integration||40|
|Lesson 22||Inelastic areas were harder hit by deindustrialization of the American labor market||42|
|Lesson 23||Elastic areas had faster rates of nonfactory job creation than inelastic areas||43|
|Lesson 24||Elastic areas showed greater real income gains than inelastic areas||44|
|Lesson 25||Elastic cities have better bond ratings than inelastic cities||45|
|Lesson 26||Elastic areas have a higher educated workforce than inelastic areas||46|
|II||Characteristics of Metropolitan Areas||51|
|The Point of (Almost) No Return||78|
|Cities without Suburbs||83|
|III||Strategies for Stretching Cities||89|
|Three Essential Regional Policies||89|
|Metro Government: A Definition||91|
|State Government's Crucial Role||93|
|Federal Government: Leveling the Playing Field||114|
|App||Central Cities and Metro Areas by Elasticity Category||139|
|Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars||155|
Interesting book: Leader in You or The Memory Jogger II
Bay of Pigs Declassified: The Secret CIA Report
Author: Peter Kornbluh
Including the complete report and a wealth of supplementary materials, this volume provides a fascinating picture of the operation and of the secret world of the espionage establishment, with elements of plots, counterplots, and intra-agency power struggles worthy of a Le Carre novel.
If the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis was the most dire event of the Cold War, then the Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961 was the most absurd. Kornbluh (director, Cuban Documentation Ctr. Project of the National Security Archive; Politics of Illusion: The Bay of Pigs Invasion Reexamined, Lynne Rienner, 1997) includes the tedious but informative report of Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick, which largely blames the CIA for misleading President Kennedy. Richard Bissell, the CIA's deputy director for plans, responds with a similarly oppressive rebuttal that attributes the failure to Kennedy's need to ensure plausible deniability--to hide America's obvious role by committing limited, insufficient air support and troops. Additional supporting documents and an interview with the invasion planners show the Bay of Pigs fiasco to be what historian Theodore Draper calls "a perfect failure." For a narrative overview, see Ale Fursenko's One Hell of a Gamble (LJ 3/15/97). Primarily for specialists in the era.--Karl Helicher, Upper Merion Twp. Lib., King of Prussia, PA
One of the most brutally frank, important - and unusual - government documents ever written, Bay of Pigs Declassified should be required reading for citizens, as well as for CIA officials as a 'how-to' guide on how not to conduct a covert operation.
A look at spooks in action that does not resemble a Tom Clancy novel.
A lingering question about the Bay of Pigs operation has always been how anyone could ever have thought it would work. Somehow presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, with the input of their military and intelligence advisers, approved an invasion plan that projected the victory of a 1,400-man exile force over the 25,000-man Cuban army. Moreover, they did so while implausibly insisting that the action must not be traced back to the US. Until recently, the cloak of secrecy has restricted efforts to explain this planning and decision-making process to idle speculation; with the publication of this volume, somewhat informed speculation is now possible. Through the Freedom of Information Act, the National Security Archive (a public-interest group), with which Kornbluh is affiliated, has obtained the CIA's internal and very critical report on the Bay of Pigs and a lengthy response from the CIA officer in charge of the operation.
Edited by Kornbluh (Nicarauga, 1987), the volume includes an analytical introduction, an interview with two CIA men involved in the planning of the operation and a detailed timeline of events. This mass of information provides insight into shifting objectives, ambiguity over responsibility and accountability, and the momentum that precluded halting or even seriously reconsidering the operation. Most striking, however, is the vigor with which those involved seek to hide behind presidential cancellation of an air strike in explaining the failure. The impulse to deflect blame clearly overrides any self-analysis that could lead to institutional learning from the experience despite the absurdity of claiming that one decision was the turning point in an operation riddled with problems. What remains unexplained is the failure of American political leadership, a puzzle that may be beyond the potential of historical documents to solve.
An eye-opening account, regardless of one's political convictions.